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Executive Summary

Introduction: About this Survey

NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, in partnership with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) conducted the fourth wave of the Foreign Relations Survey, which explores Jordanians’ perceptions of Jordan’s foreign relations as well as their views on international affairs and regional geopolitical dynamics. Data collection for this wave of the survey was conducted in August 2023, over a nationally representative sample of 1,202 adult Jordanians. The below table illustrates the breakdown of the sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarash</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
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<td>20.8%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maan</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafileh</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Sample breakdown

The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews using electronic tablets on which the survey questionnaire was programmed. The survey questionnaire was designed cooperatively between KAS and NAMA, featuring (a) Attitudes toward Foreign Policy; (b) Jordan’s Foreign Relations; (c) Geopolitical Dynamics: Regional and International Conflicts; and (d) Demographics.

Attitudes toward Foreign Policy

Looking at some of the most notable findings, Jordanians believe that Jordan is perceived positively among non-Jordanians. When asked to indicate how they think non-Jordanians see Jordan, the respondents mentioned Jordan’s safety and security, Jordanians’ chivalry and hospitality – especially to refugees, and Jordan’s tourism attractions as some of the aspects.

When it comes to whether Jordanians feel their opinions and positions are reflected within Jordan’s foreign policy, 25.6% indicated to a large extent coupled with 42.8% who stated to a medium extent. As for Jordanians’ foreign policy priorities, the responses can be categorized into
economic development, advocating for the Palestinian cause, ensuring safety and security, and acquiring support for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees in Jordan. The survey also finds that most Jordanians assess the country’s foreign policy favorably and effective in fulfilling its foreign policy objectives, with the best assessed being advancing Jordan’s role as a custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem while the worst assessed was attracting foreign investment and acquiring economic support, which was in fact identified as the top foreign policy priority by Jordanians.

The results also show that a plurality of Jordanians believe the country plays a regional role relevant to its resources while about 39% ascribed a larger role than what its resources/enablers would allow. The survey revealed that the majority of Jordanians believe the country’s regional role increased significantly (35.9%) or to some extent (38.9%) since the 2011 Arab Spring Uprisings. Of those who maintained that Jordan’s role has decreased since then, they indicated that it was caused by worsening economic conditions along with the regional conflicts, among other drivers. They also highlighted that in order to improve Jordan’s role in the region, economic development and attracting investment is imperative (36.7%), coupled with 19.2% others who took an open approach toward more partnerships and visibility.

As far as the appeal of countries is concerned, most Jordanians asserted they would prefer to travel to the United States for health treatment, university education, work, business and trade, tourism, and professional training. Germany and Saudi Arabia were close second in most of these scenarios while China was indicated as the top preferred destination for shopping. Moreover, the respondents were asked which non-Jordanian living politician they respect the most. The results show that 28% of Jordanians mentioned Turkish President Erdoğan, in line with previous polls, followed by Mohammed bin Salman with 9.2%, Vladimir Putin with 3.3%, and King Salman of Saudi Arabia and Tamim bin Hamad of Qatar with 3.2% each.

**Jordan’s Foreign Relations**

The survey results show positive views among Jordanians when it comes to Saudi Arabia, as the plurality of Jordanians view the southern neighbor as Jordan’s closest ally. Around 27% indicated the United States followed by 7.5% for Palestine and approximately 5% for the United Kingdom. While these responses would entail a fewer number of major partners for Jordan, Jordanians described the Government of Jordan’s (GOJ) political relations with 17 different countries, including Russia, Syria, Iran, and Israel, as very or somewhat good. Political relations between GOJ and governments of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Kingdom were assessed most favorably. Similarly, the majority of Jordanians even indicated in favor of strengthening such relations with all but Iran and Israel’s governments. Nearly two-thirds of Jordanians, in fact, reported in favor of limiting relations with Israel while most Jordanians were conflicted between maintaining relations with Iran (35.7%) or limiting them (35.5%).

Looking at Jordanians’ preferences for the country’s diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia was identified by most Jordanians (54.2%) as the country with which a royal state visit to Arab states should begin. For Europe, 26.7% and 26.4% of Jordanians indicated that a royal state visit to that part of the world should begin in the United Kingdom and in Germany, respectively. Over a third of Jordanians identified China as the starting point for such a visit if it were to be focused on Asia.
Only the United States was assessed as very influential in Jordan by the majority of Jordanians (62.1%). Only 10% of Jordanians indicated it was uninfluential in Jordan. This was particularly evident when compared to Russia and China, the influence of the United States was almost seven times more influential in the Middle East compared to Russia and 4.8 times more influential than China. However, the results show that this influence may not remain unchallenged for long, as when asked to think about the influence of various countries in the Middle East in 10 years’ time, the percentage of Jordanians who believe the United States will be the most influential dropped by 27.3 percentage points, countered by a 15-percentage point increase for China and 5.9 percentage points increase for Russia.

As for Jordanians’ perceptions of Jordan’s closest economic supports, 40.5% referred to the United States, followed by 35.4% who mentioned Saudi Arabia, 7.1% for China, and 4.7% for the UAE. The same four countries, albeit in different order, were highlighted more than others as the countries with whom Jordanians would like to see Jordan cooperate more in the future. Notably, 31.4% of Jordanians indicated Saudi Arabia, 17.3% indicated the United States, 9.1% for China, and 8.1% for the UAE, with nearly 7% opting for Qatar. Much of such perceptions may also be stemming from aid provision, as Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the UAE were generally among the top three responses when Jordanians were asked to name the countries, they believe is providing the most aid to Jordan. Qatar, Germany and the EU, and the United Kingdom were also prevalently mentioned.

**Geopolitical Dynamics – Regional and International Conflicts**

The majority of Jordanians (53.6%) view the Middle East to be unstable and insecure. Significantly however, the percentage of Jordanians who view the region to be stable and secure has increased by 25.6 percentage points in comparison to 2021. The biggest security threat in the region, according to Jordanians, remains Israel, as stated by 45.1%, followed by 19.1% who mentioned Iran and 6.9% who identified the United States. Israel is also seen by Jordanians to be the biggest threat to Jordan specifically by 48.5%, followed by 10.1% who indicated Syria, and 8.1% for Iran, while 23.8% believe no country is a threat to Jordan.

Jordanians were then asked to indicate their preferences for the magnitude of roles to play by a number of regional and global actors in the region. The results show the majority of Jordanians want most countries in question to have larger roles with the exception of Iran, Israel, and Syria. It is worth noting that the majority of Jordanians indicated their preference for “much larger roles” only for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. In addition to these three countries, a plurality of Jordanians prefer that Qatar, Turkey, and China play much larger roles in the region. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only two countries for whom most Jordanians also indicated that they play a very stabilizing role in addition to wanting them to play much larger roles. For the United States, Qatar, and Turkey, while Jordanians prefer that they play much larger roles, Jordanians tend to view their role as somewhat stabilizing. Most countries were seen as somewhat stabilizing, and a plurality of Jordanians want them to play some larger roles. The exceptions featured Syria (somewhat destabilizing – preference for some larger role) and Israel and Iran (very destabilizing – preference for no role at all).

The survey results reveal significant changes among Jordanians’ alignment in regional and global conflicts in a sense that Jordanians now appear more polarized than ever before. The vast
majority (85.8%) indicated Jordan should support Saudi Arabia if it were to conflict with Iran, which is consistent with previous polls. However, when it comes to the US-Russia rivalry, 45.1% of Jordanians indicated Jordan should side with the United States (up from 11% in 2021) compared to 10.6% for Russia (also up from 5% in 2021), as the percentage of Jordanians who stated the country should remain neutral in such a conflict dropped from 80% to 41.6%. Similarly, there was 30.3 percentage points increase among Jordanians who would prefer Jordan to side with the United States against China (from 10% in 2021 to 40.3%), and 19.6% indicated Jordan should side with China, up from 8%, as those who prefer the country to remain neutral dropped to 37.4% from 79% previously recorded.

When it comes to Jordanians’ attitudes toward normalizing relations with Bashar Al-Assad, the survey results demonstrate polarizing findings. While 42.2% of Jordanians indicated they fully or somewhat support the return of Syria, with Al-Assad, to the League of Arab States, over 50% indicated they somewhat oppose (9.2%) or fully oppose (40.9%). More directly, 42.8% of Jordanians asserted there should be no normalization at all with Al-Assad, followed by 40.8% who demonstrated a cautious stance whereby they preferred a “step for step” normalization, as only 6.3% reported in favor of unconditional normalization. Interestingly, 71.1% of those who support unconditional normalization were fully in favor of Syria and Al-Assad’s return to the League of Arab States, while 70.5% of those completely against any normalization with Al-Assad were fully opposed to his return to the League of Arab States.

As for what Jordan could expect from such normalization of relations with Syria and Al-Assad, Jordanians were divided into four camps: those who view it would reflect positively on Jordan’s economy (22.4%); those who emphasized security in Jordan, Syria, and the region (13.1%); those focused on the return of Syrian refugees (13%); and those who maintained that there were no benefits to the normalization of relations or that it would have adverse consequences, economically and in terms of security (18.8%).
1. Introduction

1.1 About Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a German political foundation that promotes civic education, policy analysis, and international dialogue. Active in Germany and worldwide, KAS has an office in Amman since 1982. Their programs in Jordan provide capacity-building and dialogue platforms for youth, civil society and political institutions. KAS encourages research and reflections about Jordan, its role in the Middle East and its relations with Europe.

1.2 About NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions

NAMA is a technology-driven strategic intelligence solutions provider to key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. NAMA strives to advance political, social, and economic development in the MENA region, and more specifically in Jordan by utilizing over 100 years of combined collective professional experience in polling, research, security, business consultancy, investments, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainable socio-economic development. We retain a highly experienced and agile team of researchers, consultants, experts, economists, and analysts who enrich and drive our multidisciplinary approach to transforming raw and big data into actionable intelligence that enables our clients to make strategic decisions, and who share our mission of enabling an environment that facilitates socio-economic development and informed policymaking.

1.3 Research Methodology and Work Plan

NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions conducted a survey exploring Jordanians’ perceptions in relation to foreign relations. The poll was conducted between August 22 – 30, 2023 with a nationally representative sample of 1,202 Jordanians. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews, as the fieldwork was implemented by 28 trained enumerators, supervised by 7 field observers to monitor data collection, attend to any challenges, and ensure the implementation of quality assurance measures.

The survey questionnaire was designed cooperatively between KAS and NAMA, comprising of four sections, as follows:

- General: Foreign Policy Attitudes
- Foreign Relations
- Geopolitical Dynamics: Regional and International Conflicts
- Demographics

Once the final version was approved and translated, NAMA’s methodologist programmed the survey onto electronic tablets and led a training of the field research team. The training included a discussion of the research objectives, an explanation of every question, and training on using the program as well as mock interviews.

Following that, the field team proceeded with the data collection phase, whereby the field supervisor provided them with daily assignments containing their daily targets of interviews as well as specific demographic factors to meet to ensure that the sample is nationally representative. Additionally, the supervisors illustrated the skipping patterns for the
enumerators. The supervisors coordinated with the office team to synch the tablets on a daily basis to upload the completed questionnaires to NAMA’s servers.

Then, NAMA’s analysts reviewed the data on a daily basis to apply quality assurance measures, which reviews for logic, context, mis-punching, or other unintended errors. The review looks at the data as a whole along with assessing each enumerator’s completed questionnaires.

Once the dataset passes the quality assurance measures, it is delivered to the data analysis team, who simultaneously handle the statistical analysis of the multiple-choice questions in addition to the coding and analysis of the open-ended answers through statistical analysis software such as SPSS & CSPro. The analysis also included measuring mean scores and comparisons with the 2019 and 2021 waves of the same survey.

1.4 Sample

For the purpose of this study, Jordanians aged 18 years and above were the targeted group. The National Census Frame 2015 was used to design and draw the sample. The frame provided information on the Block level (the smallest Sampling Unit). This sample was designed to provide valid and reliable survey estimates across the entire Kingdom of Jordan including rural and urban areas, each of the twelve governorates, and smaller communities within. The sample was also designed to ensure reliable estimates on regional levels (North, Center, and South) and can provide an indication at the governorate level: North (covering Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, and Mafraq), Central (covering Amman, Balqa, Madaba, and Zarqa), and South (covering Aqaba, Karak, Ma’an, and Tafieleh).

Using the 2015 Jordan Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame, a sample of 1,202 households was drawn using stratified cluster sampling with a margin of error of (±2.5%) with confidence level of 95%. The Kingdom was subdivided into area units called census blocks, which were then regrouped to form clusters— the Primary Sampling Units (PSU-Blocks) for this survey. Stratification was achieved on three levels: the classification of governorates into rural and urban areas, administrative divisions within each urban and rural area, and clusters will be identified and selected within each administrative division. The distribution of the sample among these strata will be distributed proportionally to the relative population size of each stratum (probability-proportional to the cluster size).

Once the clusters were sampled, a household listing operation of these clusters was conducted and a frame of the households in each cluster was developed. Collective homes such as student
housing, prisons, nursing homes, factory accommodations were excluded as they do not fit the definition of a Jordanian Household. The sample was designed in a way to cover the 12 governorates, using a stratified cluster proportional to size sampling method. The confidence level was about 95% at ±2.5% margin of error.

As indicated earlier, the final achieved sample comprised of 1,202 respondents, representative at the national level. In terms of male to female ratio, 49.8% of the respondents were males and 50.2% were female respondents. Further, 22.7% were respondents aged 18-29; 20.7% were aged 30-39; 20.5% were aged 40-49; and 17.2% were 50-59; and 18.9% were aged 60 years or older. In terms of regional breakdown, 53.4% of the respondents were from the Center Region of Jordan, 26.6% from the North Region, and 20% from the South Region.

2. Attitudes toward Foreign Policy

The first section of this survey report analyzes key results pertaining to Jordanians’ attitudes toward foreign policy, including how Jordanians believe foreigners perceive Jordan and an assessment of Jordan’s regional role.

2.1 Promoting Jordan: How Non-Jordanians See Jordan

The survey featured a question asked for the first time in Jordan, as NAMA and KAS looked to understand how Jordanians promote and market their country by way of extrapolating their thoughts on how non-Jordanians see Jordan. Most responses were positive and featured a mix of behavioral and resource-related perceptions. As seen in the above chart, 38.3% of Jordanians believe that non-Jordanians see Jordan as a safe, secure, and stable country. This was followed by 18.7% who stated that Jordan is seen as a country of chivalrous and generous people who are welcoming to everyone, especially to refugees. The perception that Jordan is welcoming was shared by another 13.4%
who emphasized that Jordan is a great destination for tourism, as they boasted about the people, the heritage, and the sites. About 9.2% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan is viewed positively and that foreigners respect Jordanian citizenship. Further, nearly 5% referred to Jordan’s leadership and its strive to provide quality services and improved living conditions for Jordanians. Along the same lines, 3.6% believe that non-Jordanians ascribe to Jordan a developing, up-and-coming economy with a good investment environment and technology-savvy human resources.

Not all perceptions were positive. In fact, 7.7% of the respondents believe that non-Jordanians see Jordan as a poor country with difficult economic and living conditions and a high unemployment rate. Further, 2% of the respondents indicated simply that Jordan is viewed negatively by non-Jordanians.

### 2.2 Jordanians’ Perceptions and Attitudes to Jordan’s Foreign Policy

The survey also sought to explore how Jordanians interact with Jordan’s foreign policy and its priorities. More specifically, the survey gauged Jordanians’ perceptions in terms of the extent to which they feel their opinions are reflected in Jordan’s foreign policy priorities along with defining these priorities from their point of view and assessing Jordan’s effectiveness in achieving its foreign policy objectives.

The majority of Jordanians believe that their opinions/positions are reflected within Jordan’s foreign policy priorities, as 25.6% indicated to a large extent and 42.8% stated to a medium extent. About 10% indicated that their views are reflected within Jordan’s foreign policy to a low extent while 18.2% of Jordanians believe they are not represented at all.

When Jordanians were asked to indicate what Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority should be, it was expected to see priorities pertaining to economic development and growth featured heavily. In fact, 40.2% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority should be to facilitate agreements to develop the economy, attract investments, and create jobs.

![Figure 3: In your opinion, what should Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority be?](image-url)
economy, attract investments, and create jobs. This was coupled with 3.2% and 2.7% who indicated promoting Jordan globally to attract more tourism and bringing in support to improve the services provided to Jordanians.

In line with Jordanians’ view that non-Jordanians see Jordan as a place welcoming of refugees, a substantial percentage referred to supporting refugees as what ought to be Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority. While 3.2% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan needs to acquire more support for Syrian refugees and work with partners toward a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the conflict to enable the safe return of Syrian refugees, 19.1% of Jordanians emphasized Jordan’s role in advocating for the Palestinian cause. They stated that Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority should be to advocate for the rights of Palestinians and protect the Holy Sites in Jerusalem.

The rest of the responses were security-oriented. 8.6% of Jordanians believe that the most important foreign policy priority should be ensuring the safety, security, and stability of Jordan and the region, coupled with 8.3% others who indicated the priority should be to enhance bilateral relations, especially with global powers, to improve Jordan’s geopolitical importance.

Analyzing the indicated individual foreign policy priorities in terms of the extent to which Jordanians feel their opinions and positions are reflected in- Jordan’s foreign policy priorities provide an indicative view of the alignment between Jordanians’ perceived engagement and their priorities. As seen in the figure below, 38.8% of those who stated the most important foreign policy priority for Jordan should be to ensure safety and security indicated that they feel their opinions are reflected to a large extent, coupled with nearly 44% who indicated to a medium extent. Over a quarter of Jordanians who mentioned priorities related to bringing support, whether to Jordanians or to Syrian refugees in Jordan, indicated that their opinions are not at all reflected within Jordan’s foreign policy priorities.

| Priority                                                                                                | Not at All | To a Low Extent | To a Medium Extent | To a Large Extent | Total
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure the safety, security, and stability of Jordan and the region</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for the rights of Palestinians and the Palestinian cause and protect holy sites in Jerusalem</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote Jordan globally to attract more tourism</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire support for Syrian refugees and find a solution to the conflict for their safe return</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate agreements to develop the economy, attract investments, and create jobs</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring in support and aid to improve the services provided to Jordanians</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance bilateral relations, especially with global powers, to improve Jordan’s geopolitical importance</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: In your opinion, what should Jordan’s most important foreign policy priority be? [Analyzed in terms of the extent to which Jordanians feel their opinions/ positions are reflected within Jordan’s foreign policy priorities]*
Further, when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of Jordan in achieving its foreign policy objectives, an average of 60% of Jordanians evaluated Jordan’s performance in that regard as very effective. Specifically, 71% percent of Jordanians assessed Jordan as very effective in advancing Jordan’s role as a custodian of holy sites in Jerusalem, coupled with 21.3% others who believe it is somewhat effective. Similarly, 69.9% of Jordanians believe that Jordan is very effective in positioning itself as a global destination for tourism, as a quarter of Jordanians indicated it is somewhat effective in fulfilling this objective. When it comes to defending the rights of the Palestinians, 67.9% of Jordanians see that Jordan is very effective in fulfilling this target and 23.7% believe it is somewhat effective. Additionally, 63.2% of Jordanians assessed the country as very effective in acquiring support for refugees in Jordan, as 29.4% others assessed its performance as somewhat effective.

When asked about Jordan’s efficacy in positioning itself as a regional player, 57.9% of Jordanians believe it is very effective and 33.6% others indicated somewhat effective. When it comes to Jordan’s foreign policy effectiveness in garnering diplomatic support for Jordan’s positions, 53.7% believe that it is very effective and 34.9% believe it is somewhat effective. It is worth noting that 20.3% and 20% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan’s foreign policy is somewhat or very ineffective in attracting foreign investment and in acquiring economic support, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Very Effective</th>
<th>Somewhat Effective</th>
<th>Somewhat Ineffective</th>
<th>Very Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advancing Jordan’s role as a custodian of holy sites in Jerusalem</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positioning Jordan as a global destination for tourism</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending the rights of the Palestinians</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring support for refugees in Jordan</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positioning Jordan as a regional player</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garnering diplomatic support for Jordan’s positions</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring economic support</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracting foreign investments</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Thinking about Jordan’s foreign policy, in your opinion, to what extent would you say it is effective in achieving each of the following objectives?
2.3 Jordanians’ Attitudes to Jordan’s Regional Role

Next, the survey looked to explore Jordanians’ perceptions of Jordan’s regional role in terms of its resources and in relation to the implications of the Arab Spring Uprisings in 2011. The results show that 38.7% of Jordanians believe that Jordan plays a much more significant regional role than its resources (enablers) would allow. Another 41.7% of Jordanians stated that Jordan plays a regional role that is relevant/appropriate to its resources, as 17.6% of the respondents think that Jordan plays a regional role much less than its resources should allow.

As for the implications of the Arab Spring, the results demonstrate that 35.9% of Jordanians believe that Jordan’s regional role has increased to a great extent since the Arab Spring in 2011 and 38.9% believe it has increased to some extent. Further, 10.8% of Jordanians stated that Jordan’s regional role has remained as it was before 2011. Only 11.3% of Jordanians believe that Jordan’s role has decreased to some extent (7.5%) or to a great extent (3.8%).

Of the 11.3% of Jordanians (266 respondents out of 1,202) who stated that Jordan’s role in the region has decreased since the Arab Spring, 27.8% reasoned that its role decreased due to the worsening of economic conditions such as unemployment and price hikes. Another 19.5% attributed the decline to the lack of progress and improvement. Further, 15% indicated that the decline in Jordan’s role is due to regional conflicts and foreign interventions which place Jordan at a disadvantage, as 8.3% referenced the influx of refugees and overpopulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worsening economic conditions: unemployment and price hikes</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of progress and improvement</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional conflicts and foreign interventions are pressuring Jordan</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The influx of refugees and overpopulation</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of administrative corruption</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/Refused to answer</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6: If answered that Jordan’s role “decreased” since the Arab Spring (2011), why? (Of those who indicated that Jordan’s role has decreased to a great or some extent since the Arab Spring (11.3% of respondents; n=266))*

The same respondents who indicated that Jordan’s regional role has decreased since 2011’s Arab Spring Uprisings were also asked to recommend approaches through which Jordan can improve its regional role. Understandably, 37.6% (of the 266 respondents) indicated improving the economy, creating job opportunities, and attracting investments would improve Jordan’s regional role. Similarly, 19.2% indicated increasing Jordan’s partnership and foreign outreach, representation, and visibility would help improve its regional role. They mentioned that Jordan
should have proactive and visible representation in all regional and global high-level conferences and summits. Another 6.4% pinpointed that political and administrative reforms and combatting corruption ought to be prioritized toward that end.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvement Area</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving the economy, creating job opportunities, and attracting investments</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing its partnership and foreign outreach, representation, and visibility</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and administrative reforms and combatting corruption</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the issue of refugees in Jordan</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming more decisive and proactive in its foreign policies, including the Palestinian cause</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging human and natural resources more effectively</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7: What needs to be done to improve Jordan’s regional role? (Of those who indicated that Jordan’s role has decreased to a great or some extent since the Arab Spring (11.3% of respondents; n=266))*

### 2.4 Favorability of Politicians and Countries’ Attractions

Next, the survey looked to acquire a macro-level view of Jordanians’ favorability toward the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia by inquiring about which of these countries Jordanians would opt to travel for health treatment, university education, professional training, work, business and trade, tourism, and shopping.

The results show that, when it comes to health treatment, 44.9% of Jordanians stated they would travel to the United States, followed by 24.7% for Germany, 5.8% for Saudi Arabia, 4% for China, and 2.5% for Russia. As for university education, 44.6% of Jordanians also indicated they would opt to travel to the United States for that goal, followed by 16.6% for Germany, 15.7% for Saudi Arabia, 6% for Russia, and 2.2% for China. Similarly, 25.4% of Jordanians highlighted they would travel to the United States for professional training, followed by 24.6% for Germany, 15.1% for Saudi Arabia, 17.3% for China, and 3.3% for Russia.

When it comes to work, 42.5% of Jordanians indicated they would move to the United States, 35.8% indicated Saudi Arabia, and 11.1% for Germany. As for business and trade, 29.1% of
Jordanians indicated they would travel to the United States for that purpose, followed by 28.6% for China, and 20.1% for Saudi Arabia. Similarly – for tourism, 25.8% of Jordanians indicated the United States, 22.5% for Saudi Arabia, 18.7% for Germany, 10.4% for Russia, and 6.6% for China. When it comes to shopping, 27.5% of Jordanians stated they would travel to China, followed by 23.2% for the United States, 19.4% for Saudi Arabia, and 10.2% for Germany, compared to just 2.8% for Russia.

Further, the survey asked Jordanians to indicate the non-Jordanian, living politician they respect the most. Similar to previous polls, 28% of Jordanians mentioned Turkish President Erdoğan, followed by 9.2% of Jordanians who indicated Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, along with 3.2% who indicated King Salman – demonstrating that the royal Saudi family is very respected by the public.

Additionally, 3.3% of Jordanians stated that Russia’s Vladimir Putin was the non-Jordanian politician they respect the most. Another 3.2% of Jordanians mentioned Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, as 1.2% others indicated Egypt’s Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. For the first time in recent polls, Chinese President Xi Jinping was mentioned as the most respected non-Jordanian politician, albeit it was only 0.4% of Jordanians. Around 0.3% mentioned the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed, as 33.8% did not indicate anyone, 9.9% were unsure, and 7.7% chose other figures.
3. Foreign Relations

The second section of the survey gauged Jordanians’ perceptions on Jordan’s foreign relations, with emphasis on political alliances, diplomatic relations, appeal and influence, and economic partnerships and attractions.

3.1 Jordanians’ Perceptions of Jordan’s Political Alliances and Relations

Jordanians’ favorability of Saudi Arabia has been noticeably on the rise. The survey results show that nearly 43% of Jordanians believe Jordan’s southern neighbor is the closest political ally for Jordan. Over one quarter of Jordanians (27%) indicated the United States, followed by 7.5% who referenced Palestine, and about 5% for the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that most Jordanians (65.5%) named a neighboring Arab state as Jordan’s closest political ally, compared to around one third for a Western nation.

![Figure 10: In your view, which country is the closest political ally of Jordan?](image)

When asked to describe the Jordanian Government’s (GOJ) political relations with its counterparts from 17 different countries, the results show that most Jordanians view all relations as very or somewhat good. This demonstrates that Jordanians see their government on good terms with the countries in question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Good Political Relations</th>
<th>Bad Political Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>Somewhat good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the following governments?

In fact, Jordanians’ positive attitudes toward GOJ’s political relations has been steadily increasing over the past few years. More Jordanians are describing the GOJ’s political relations with foreign government as good. More specifically, the analysis shows an average of 2.5 percentage points increase among Jordanians who describe political relations as good (3 percentage points increase among who describe political relations as very good), coupled with an average of one percentage point decrease among those who describe them as bad.

Similarly, when asked to indicate whether they prefer that the GOJ strengthens its political relations with governments of each of the 17 countries, maintains them at their present level, or limits them, the results show a majority of Jordanians in favor of strengthening relations with all except for the Iranian and Israeli governments. While nearly two-thirds of Jordanians indicated they were in favor of limiting political relations with the Israeli government, 35.7% of Jordanians were in favor of keeping relations with the Iranian government at the present level and 35.5% opted for limiting political relations.
Additionally, the figure below illustrates that Jordanians believe the GOJ has very good political relations, and they would like to strengthen these relations with each of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, China, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States, respectively. The analysis also shows that Jordanians believe the GOJ has somewhat good political relations, and they want to strengthen them with each of Germany, Japan, Canada, France, Syria, and Russia, respectively. Jordanians also assessed that the GOJ has somewhat good political relations with each of Iran and Israel’s governments, but they prefer such relations to be maintained at its present level for the former and limited for the latter.

### 3.2 Jordanians’ Preferences for Jordan’s Diplomatic Relations

The survey asked Jordanians to indicate which countries should be most prioritized for official royal state visits to Arab states, to Europe, and to Asia. The results notably show the following:

- When it comes to Arab states, over half of Jordanians (54.2%), indicated that if there was a royal state visit, it should start with Saudi Arabia. 11.6% indicated that it should begin with Qatar, followed by 9.8% for the UAE, and 9% for Palestine.

- When asked about Europe specifically, the United Kingdom and Germany came in first and second with 26.7% and 26.4%, respectively, followed by France with 7.5%, Russia with 3.7%, Turkey with 3.5%, and Italy with 2.8%.

- As for Asia, over third of Jordanians (34.7%) indicated that if there was a royal state visit, it should start with China. Another 16% named Japan, followed by 3.2% and 3.1% for Malaysia and India, respectively. It is worth noting that 22.9% stated they were unsure.

*Figure 13: Suppose there is a royal state visit to ..., which country do you think the trip should start with?*
3.3 Jordanians’ Assessment of Foreign Actors’ Influence in Jordan

Jordanians were asked to rate the influence of each of the same 17 countries in Jordan. The results show that the majority of Jordanians rated all but Iran as influential in Jordan. The only country which the majority of Jordanians rated as “very influential” was the United States, as only 10% indicated that it is not influential. The influence of the United States is also visible in comparison to Russia and China, who are generally seen as the US’ main rising competitors globally and in the region. In fact, the percentage of Jordanians who rated the influence of the United States were nearly four-fold that of Russia and 1.6 times that of China.

Further, the United States was also viewed as nearly 7 times more influential in the Middle East now than Russia and 4.8 times more influential than China, as 69.9% of Jordanians asserted that the United States is more influential in the region now than China, Russia, and Europe.

![Figure 14: How would you rate the influence of the following countries in Jordan?](image-url)
However, when asked to indicate which of these countries will become more influential in the Middle East in 10 years, there was a 27.3 percentage point decrease among Jordanians who indicated the United States, which leveled at 42.6% of Jordanians. This was accompanied by an increase among Jordanians who indicated China, Russia, and Europe. In fact, the percent of Jordanians who indicated China doubled, as there was a 5.9 percentage point increase among those who indicated Russia. Thus, perhaps it is not Russia who would challenge the United States’ influence in the Middle East, rather, it might be China with its economic appeal.

### 3.4 Jordanians’ Perceptions of Jordan’s Economic Partnerships and Relations

China’s rise and economic appeal was also visible when Jordanians were asked to indicate which country is Jordan’s closest economic supporter. Previously, no more than 0.8% of Jordanians mentioned China as Jordan’s closest economic partner or ally, but this time, 7.1% of Jordanians indicated China. Nevertheless, the United States topped the list, as it was named by 40.5% of Jordanians as the country’s closest economic partner, followed by Saudi Arabia with 35.4%.

![Figure 16: In your view, which country is the closest economic supporter/partner of Jordan?](image)

![Figure 15: Thinking about regional competition, among the following countries, which is more influential in the Middle East now? And thinking about regional competition, among the following countries, which will be more influential in the Middle East in 10 years?](image)
The same first three countries featured again when Jordanians were asked to indicate the country which they believe Jordan should cooperate more in the future. The results show that 31.4% of Jordanians indicated Saudi Arabia, followed by 17.3% for the United States, and 9.1% for China. The UAE and Qatar were mentioned by 8.1% and 6.8% of Jordanians, respectively.

Further analysis shows an increased appeal for Saudi Arabia when comparing the findings with the previous survey conducted in 2021. As shown in the chart below, more Jordanians indicated Saudi as Jordan’s closest partner and as the country with which they wish to see Jordan cooperate more in the future. The rise of Saudi is mirrored by some increase in China’s appeal as indicated earlier, along with a slight decrease in the United States’ economic attraction.
Saudi Arabia also ranked first as the country that Jordanians think is giving the most aid to Jordan. Jordanians were asked to indicate the country they think is giving the most aid to Jordan, the second most aid, and the third most aid. When grouped together, 26.4% indicated Saudi Arabia, followed by 21.7% for the United States, 13.1% for the UAE, 9.7% for Qatar, 4.4% for Germany and the EU, and 4.2% for the UK. Japan and China leveled with 1.9% of the responses, each, as 6.2% indicated others, including Kuwait, Iraq, and Russia.

Germany’s appeal for Jordanians appears to be centered in the quality of its products. In fact, 50.1% of Jordanians indicated they would trust German products the most against American products (29.4%), Chinese products (12.9%), and Russian products (3.2%). The quality of German production and innovative industries were some of the main cross-cutting themes that featured heavily in Jordanians’ perceptions of Germany.
4. Geopolitical Dynamics

The third section looked to survey Jordanians’ perceptions in terms of regional dynamics, stability and security, regional and international conflicts, and in relation to normalizing relations with Syria and Bashar Al-Assad in light of Syria’s return to the League of Arab States.

4.1 An Assessment of Stability and Security

The survey reveals some unprecedented results, as the percentage of Jordanians who believe that things are stable and secure in the Middle East more than doubled when compared to the previous poll conducted in 2021. While 13.7% of Jordanians saw that the region was stable and secure in 2019, the percentage increased to 20% in 2021, and now it stands at 45.6%, with just 8 percentage points less than those who still believe the Middle East is unstable and insecure.

While Jordanians were not asked to clarify how or why the region is stable and secure, it is realistic to say that coverage of regional turmoil such as violent extremism has decreased over the past couple of years. Much of the region’s instability, at least in terms of what is disseminated in the media, tends to be political, rather than security related. In that sense, Jordanians are more likely to associate stability and security when wars and battles are slightly less prevalent in media content and public discussions. Such a decrease could also be attributed to increased tolerance to security threats.

This is evident in the fact that just 1.2% of Jordanians specified extremist and terrorist groups, such as Daesh, as the region’s biggest security threat. The list was expectedly topped by Israel, with 45.1% of Jordanians, albeit down from 53%. 19.1% of Jordanians indicated that Iran is the region’s biggest security threat, marking an increase from 12% recorded in 2021. Conversely, 6.9% referred to the United States, which decreased from 20%. Russia and Syria increased from 2% and 1% to 5% and 4.3%, respectively, as the region’s biggest security threat. It is worth noting that 4.5% of Jordanians indicated there was not any security threat to the region, marking an increase from 1% recorded in the previous survey in 2021.
Zooming in on Jordan specifically, the survey finds that 48.5% of Jordanians believe that Israel is Jordan’s biggest security threat, about 1.5 percentage points less when compared to the previous survey conducted in 2021. Syria came in second as noted by 10.1% of Jordanians, demonstrating a 7.1 percentage point increase from the previous survey. While Iran saw a slight increase from 7% of Jordanians in 2021 to 8.1% of Jordanians in this survey, the percentage of Jordanians who indicated the United States decreased from 7% to 2.2% between the two surveys. It is also worth noting that 23.8% of Jordanians indicated that there was not any source of security threat to Jordan, up from 19%.
4.2 Jordanians’ Perceptions and Preferences for Countries’ Roles in the Region

Jordanians were asked to indicate whether they prefer that each of the 17 countries in question play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role, or no role at all in the region. The results show that with the exception of Israel, Iran, and Syria, Jordanians indicated preference for a larger role for each of the remaining countries. The intensity of such preferences was highest for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States, as the majority of Jordanians indicated they prefer that each of these countries play a much larger role.

![Figure 24: Do you prefer the following countries to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?](image)

For countries such as China, Qatar, and Turkey, the gap between those who indicated they prefer these countries to play a “much larger role” and those who indicated “some larger role” was minimal. Jordanians also appear most unsure about Syria, as 48.5% indicated much larger or some larger role while 50% indicated a smaller role or no role at all. Further, when comparing the two poles (much larger role vs. no role at all), there is a 10.6 percentage gap in favor of the latter. Similarly, there is a 9.2 percentage points difference between those who indicated they prefer Syria to play some larger role and those who maintained that it should play a smaller role, in favor of the former.

When comparing the findings with the previous two waves (2019 and 2021), the results show that the only country for which Jordanians maintained their stance, between the three waves, to play a much larger role was the United States. Jordanians also remained consistent for Israel and
Iran as the only two countries that Jordanians do not want to see them have any role in the region. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and China saw a similar trajectory, as the percentage of Jordanians who want to see them play a larger role increased consistently between the three surveys. Egypt, Iraq, Germany, the UK, and Japan zigzagged between the three surveys, as the plurality of Jordanians wanted to see them play some larger role in 2019, then much larger role in 2021 before returning to some larger role in 2023.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Much Larger Role</th>
<th>Some Larger Role</th>
<th>No Role at All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Flags" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Flags" /></td>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Flags" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 25: Do you prefer the following countries to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region? (Comparison with previous polls; highest percentage was used to determine country placement)*

Next, the respondents were asked to assess whether each of the same 17 countries play a stabilizing or destabilizing role in the region. Saudi Arabia was the only country for which the majority of Jordanians saw that it plays a very stabilizing role. Most countries were seen that they play a role that is somewhat stabilizing. On the other hand, Israel, Iran, and Syria were assessed...
as destabilizing for the region, as the majority of Jordanians indicated that both Israel and Iran play roles that are very destabilizing.

When examining each of the 17 countries in terms of the roles Jordanians want them to play and in terms of how Jordanians assess the impact of their roles on the region’s stability, the figure below demonstrates five main groups:

- First, only Saudi Arabia and the UAE were seen very stabilizing for the region and Jordanians want them to play much larger roles.
- Second, for the United States, Qatar, and Turkey, they were seen as though they play somewhat stabilizing roles, and Jordanians do want to see them play much larger roles.
- The third group featured the majority of the assessed countries. Egypt, Germany, China, the UK, Japan, Canada, Iraq, France, and Russia were seen by Jordanians as somewhat stabilizing and Jordanians want to see them play some larger role.

Figure 26: Do you believe that each of the following countries is playing a stabilizing or destabilizing role in the region?
- The fourth group saw Syria alone, for which Jordanians believe it plays a somewhat destabilizing role, yet they want to see it play some larger role.
- Finally, both Israel and Iran were viewed very destabilizing and Jordanians do not want any role for them in the region.

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Figure 27: Jordanians' preferences for the magnitude of roles and their perceptions for the extent to which countries play a stabilizing role; (Highest percentage was used to determine country placement)

### 4.3 Jordan’s Orientations in Regional and International Conflicts

#### 4.3.1 Regional Conflicts: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel

When looking at Jordanian level of support for regional countries if they were to engage in conflicts with other regional countries, the results show Jordanians are demonstrating unconditional support for Saudi Arabia. Nearly 86% of Jordanians indicated they would support Saudi if it were to conflict with Iran, compared to 1.1% for the latter, as 11.8% remained neutral.

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Figure 28: If there was a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who should Jordan support?
Jordanians’ level of support for Iran has generally been low, much as the case is for Israel. Therefore, when asked to indicate which of the two countries Jordan should support if a conflict would emerge between them, 29.1% of Jordanians stated that Jordan should back Iran while 4.7% opted for Israel. About 64.6% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan should remain neutral in such a case. While the percent of Jordanians who selected Iran was 6-fold that of those who indicated Israel, this is rather attributed to Jordanians’ rejection for alignment with Israel, more so than it would reflect on any alignment with Iran.

4.3.2 Global Conflicts with Regional Implications: The United States, Russia, and China

Jordanians’ preferred alignment for Jordan when it comes to the US-Russia and US-China rivalries saw intriguing new attitudes when compared to historic trends. In fact, while 10% and 11%, in 2019 and 2021 respectively, indicated that Jordan should back the US if it were to have a conflict with Russia, this survey finds that 45.1% of Jordanians would prefer Jordan to align with the US. Similarly, 10.6% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan should stand with Russia, compared to 3.7% in 2019 and 5% in 2021. Meaning, the percent of Jordanians who want to see their country backing Russia in such a context doubled, but those who want Jordan to align with the US more than quadrupled. As seen in the chart below, these shifts stem from a declining preference for neutrality, which almost halved. In fact, 41.6% of Jordanians would prefer the country to remain neutral, demonstrating over 38 percentage points decline compared to the previous survey.
Similar trends can be observed when asked about Jordanians’ preferences for Jordan’s alignment if a conflict would arise between the United States and China. Over 40% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan should align with the United States, compared to 10% in 2021 and 7.3% in 2019. On the other hand, 19.6% of Jordanians opted that Jordan should align with China, also showing an increase from 8% that was recorded in 2021 and 9.2% in 2019. Again, such a polarization is stemming from a declining preference for neutrality, as 37.4% of Jordanians would like Jordan to remain neutral, declining by 41.6 percentage points from the 79% recorded in 2021.

When looking at the Russian-Ukrainian war, 37.4% of Jordanians believe Russia is responsible for the conflict, followed by 27.6% for the United States, 7% for Ukraine, 4.4% for Europe, and 1.8% for China. In comparison to previous polls conducted by NAMA, there is a 16.8 percentage point increase among those who believe Russia is responsible, as 20.6% indicated Russia to be responsible in March 2023 and 20.6% in March 2022. On the other hand, there is a 13.3 percentage point decrease among those who put the blame on Ukraine, going from 13.6% in 2022 to 20.3% in March 2023 to 7% now.
4.4 Jordanians’ Attitudes to Normalizing Relations with Syria and Bashar Al-Assad

The survey looked to understand Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syria and Bashar Al-Assad, especially when it comes to normalizing relations. As such, as Syria was brought back to rejoin the League of Arab States and was headed by Al-Assad during the Arab Summit held in Jeddah in May 2023, the survey shows that over half of Jordanians do not support the return of Syria to the League of Arab States with Al-Assad as president (40.9% fully opposed). About 20% indicated they fully support and 22.1% indicated they somewhat support the decision. Looking at the two ends of the scale, the percent of those who fully oppose is double those who fully support the decision.

When examining how Jordanians view formalizing relations with Syria’s Al-Assad, the results show that most Jordanians (42.8%) do not want normalization at all with Al-Assad, followed by 40.8% who believe caution is necessary, and they opted for a step for step normalization. Only 6.3% of Jordanians prefer unconditional normalization of relations with Al-Assad.

When combining these two questions and further analyze the results, there appears to be a clear polarization in Jordanians’ views on Al-Assad. As seen in the chart below, 71.1% of Jordanians,
who fully support Syria’s return to the League of Arab States with Al-Assad as president, noted they prefer unconditional normalization with Al-Assad. On the other hand, 70.5% of Jordanians, who fully oppose the return of Syria to the League with Al-Assad as president, do not want any normalization with him. When it comes to those who believe a step for step normalization is most ideal, the analysis shows they support the return of Syria and Al-Assad to the League. Meaning, despite their support for the decision, they remain unsure about normalization.

When asked about what Jordanians believe Jordan’s expectations were from normalizing relations with Bashar Al-Assad, 18.4% indicated that it was to improve economic relations and facilitate trade between the two countries. Jordan’s economic conditions suffered substantially from closing its northern borders at the height of the Syrian conflict; thus, it is understandable that many Jordanians attribute Jordan’s expectations to be economic. Further, 13% indicated the safe repatriation of Syrian refugees back to Syria as the main expectation out of normalizing relations with Al-Assad. Security featured prevalently, as 7.2% and 5.9% respectively indicated that Jordan’s expectations were to ensure security in Jordan, Syria, and the region and to safeguard Jordan’s northern border against drugs and terrorism.

It is also worth noting that nearly 14% of Jordanians do not think anything will change and that there would be no benefit to normalizing relations with Al-Assad. They are also coupled with
nearly 5% who added that normalizing relations with Al-Assad will have adverse economic and security consequences on Jordan. Over a third of Jordanians were unsure or just indicated that they support or oppose the normalization of relations with Al-Assad.

![Figure 36: What do you think Jordan’s expectations are from normalizing relations with Bashar Al-Assad?](image-url)
5. Sample’s Demographic Breakdown

5.1 Age Groups

![Age Groups Chart](image)

Figure 37: Age Groups

5.2 Sex of Respondents

![Sex of Respondent Chart](image)

Figure 38: Sex of Respondent
5.3 Marital Status

![Bar Chart: Marital Status]

Figure 39: Marital Status

5.4 Education Level

![Bar Chart: Education Level]

Figure 40: Education Level
5.5 Assessment of Monthly Income

**Figure 41:** Which one of the following statements best describes the income of your family?

### 5.6 Governorates

**Figure 42:** Governorates